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RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I.

STATE V. PEARSON1

In State v. Pearson, the Montana Supreme Court held that
methamphetamine discovered during an unlawful search of a defendant’s
fanny pack was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.2 The
Court determined that the officers initiated lawful investigatory proceedings
and intended to arrest the defendant prior to the unlawful search.3 Therefore, a routine inventory search at the police station would have inevitably
revealed the methamphetamine.4
This case arose after two Billings Police Officers, Officer LaMantia
(“LaMantia”) and Officer Kristjanson (“Kristjanson”), stopped Thomas
Pearson (“Pearson”) for driving with a broken tail light.5 Rather than stopping on the road, Pearson pulled into a parking lot. The officers then observed Pearson making “furtive movements” as LaMantia approached his
vehicle.6 Pearson appeared to reach across the passenger seat, causing
Kristjanson to fear that he was trying to grab a weapon.7 Kristjanson also
observed a “meth watch” sticker on Pearson’s window. Kristjanson testified that methamphetamine users commonly display these stickers on their
cars.8
When he reached Pearson’s vehicle, LaMantia saw Pearson holding “a
large wad of cash.”9 LaMantia soon learned that Pearson did not have in1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

State v. Pearson, 251 P.3d 152 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 157–158.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Pearson, 251 P.3d at 154.
Id.
Id.
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surance and had allowed his registration to expire.10 A subsequent license
search revealed that Pearson was on probation and had used drugs in the
past.11
The officers conducted a protective pat down of Pearson and removed
and searched his fanny pack.12 They did not initially discover any weapons
or contraband.13 Shortly thereafter, Kristjanson observed a can of pepper
spray in plain view near the driver’s seat of Pearson’s vehicle.14 Because
Kristjanson was aware that probationers cannot lawfully possess pepper
spray, he detained Pearson and put him in the patrol car, but he did not
arrest Pearson at this time.15 Kristjanson then made an attempt to contact
Officer Pinnick (“Pinnick”), Pearson’s probation officer.16
Following his detainment, Pearson gave the officers written consent to
search his vehicle, where they found drug paraphernalia.17 Officer Vickery
(“Vickery”) arrived at the scene and conducted a second search of Pearson’s fanny pack. This time, the officers discovered that the fanny pack
contained a bindle18 of methamphetamine.19 After the officers seized the
methamphetamine, they were able to contact Pinnick, who authorized a probation violation hold on Pearson.20
The district court denied Pearson’s motion to suppress the evidence
obtained by the officers during the searches of Pearson’s fanny pack and
car.21 The court determined that “officer safety concerns justified the first
search of Pearson’s fanny pack,” and “Pearson’s written consent justified
the officers’ search of his car.”22 The district court found Vickery’s second
search of Pearson’s fanny pack to be unlawful, but declined to suppress the
methamphetamine evidence because it would have inevitably been discovered during a routine inventory search or the probationary search authorized
by Pinnick.23
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
decision to admit the methamphetamine evidence.24 The Court determined
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 154.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 155.
18. A bindle is a “single-purpose container used to carry illegal drugs.” Ambrose v. State, 221 P.3d
364, 365 (Alaska App. 2009).
19. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 155.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 158.
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that even though Vickery did not have a warrant or warrant exception justifying the second search of Pearson’s fanny pack, the methamphetamine
would have inevitably been discovered during a routine inventory search at
the police station.25
Normally, the exclusionary rule prohibits evidence obtained through
unlawful searches from being introduced at trial.26 The exclusionary rule
does not apply, however, if the evidence “would have been discovered despite the unlawful government intrusion.”27 The Court explained that the
doctrine of inevitable discovery generally applies “when investigatory procedures already were in progress and the lawful investigation eventually
would have revealed the evidence.”28 But, “it must appear ‘as certainly as
night follows day’ that the evidence would have been discovered without
reference to the violation of the defendant’s rights.”29
Relying on its reasoning in State v. Hilgendorf,30 the Court concluded
that the methamphetamine in Pearson’s case would have inevitably been
discovered during a routine inventory search.31 The Court explained that
Kristjanson handcuffed Pearson, put him in the patrol car, and attempted to
contact Pinnick before Vickery searched his fanny pack.32 Kristjanson also
testified that he intended to arrest Pearson for the pepper spray violation
alone.33 This probation violation justified Pearson’s immediate arrest independent of the officers’ discovery of the methamphetamine.34 Additionally,
Pinnick “would have authorized Pearson’s arrest based solely on the pepper
spray violation or drug paraphernalia.”35 Following arrest, officers at the
detention center would have inevitably discovered the methamphetamine
contained in Pearson’s fanny pack during a routine inventory search.36
The Court also addressed Justice Nelson’s dissenting argument that the
inevitable discovery doctrine could not excuse the unlawful search because
Pinnick did not authorize Pearson’s detention until after the search took
25. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 156–157.
26. Id.at 156 (citing State v. Hilgendorf, 208 P.3d 401, 405 (Mont. 2009) (internal citations omitted); Mont. Code Ann. § 46–13–302 (2011)).
27. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 156 (citing Hilgendorf, 208 P.3d at 406).
28. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 156–157 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449–450 (1984)).
29. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 157 (quoting Hilgendorf, 208 P.3d at 406 (internal citations omitted)).
30. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 157 (citing Hilgendorf, 208 P.3d at 406). In Hilgendorf, the Court admitted drug evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine, reasoning that the officer was going to arrest
the defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia before an allegedly unlawful search occurred. 208
P.3d at 406.
31. Pearson, 251 P.3d at 157.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 158.
35. Id. at 157.
36. Id.
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place.37 The Court countered that Kristjanson was in the process of arresting Pearson before Vickery discovered the methamphetamine.38 Thus,
Kristjanson had initiated lawful investigatory proceedings that would have
inevitably led to the discovery of the methamphetamine prior to the unlawful search.39
Justice Nelson dissented from the Court’s decision to admit the unlawfully obtained methamphetamine evidence.40 He argued that Kristjanson
did not actually place Pearson under arrest or read him his Miranda rights
until after the methamphetamine had been discovered.41 Justice Nelson
also focused on Kristjanson’s testimony that he would never have transported Pearson to the detention facility absent Pinnick’s approval.42 Because the unlawful search occurred before Pinnick authorized Kristjanson to
transport Pearson, it was not “inevitable” that the methamphetamine would
have been discovered.43
Montana practitioners should be aware that the Court may apply the
inevitable discovery doctrine when a routine inventory search would have
revealed evidence even if officers fail to arrest a defendant prior to conducting an unlawful search. So long as officers intend to arrest a defendant
and initiate investigatory proceedings based upon an independent offense,
evidence obtained from a subsequent unlawful search may be admissible if
it would have been inevitably discovered at the police station.
—Mac Bloom
II.

STATE V. NORQUAY44

In State v. Norquay, the Montana Supreme Court reached two noteworthy holdings, each matters of first impression in Montana.45 First, the
Court held that admitting a videotaped deposition of the State’s expert DNA
witness did not violate the defendant’s right to confront the witness because
pregnancy prevented the witness from attending trial.46 The Court reasoned
that since the State made a good faith effort to procure the witness, the
district court properly allowed the videotaped testimony.47 Second, the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Pearson, 251 P.3d at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Pearson, 251 P.3d at 161.
State v. Norquay, 248 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 821–823.
Id. at 822.
Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol73/iss1/4

4

Law Review: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-1\MON105.txt

2012

unknown

LEGAL SHORTS

Seq: 5

9-APR-12

14:19

203

Court held that the district court’s Allen instruction (a pattern instruction
given to encourage deadlocked juries to come to a resolution) did not unduly pressure the jury to reach a unanimous verdict.48 Nonetheless, the
Court adopted significant changes to the Allen instruction.49
On the evening of November 24, 2006, Kim A. Norquay, Jr. (“Norquay”) and several others gathered at a house party to drink alcohol.50 At
the party, several men verbally and physically assaulted Lloyd Kvelstad
(“Kvelstad”) and threatened to sexually assault him.51 Kvelstad eventually
passed out from intoxication and was taken to a bed.52 Nathan and Georgetta Oats found Kvelstad unconscious at around 1:30 a.m.53 His face
was beaten “beyond recognition” and a black string was around his neck.54
Soon after, paramedics arrived and pronounced Kvelstad dead.55 At trial,
one witness testified that Norquay removed the black string from his sweatshirt and another testified that Norquay told her he strangled Kvelstad using
the string.56
The State charged Norquay with deliberate homicide, claiming he participated in an aggravated assault that resulted in Kvelstad’s death.57 It also
charged Norquay with tampering with physical evidence for allegedly wiping blood from his shoe.58
Initially, the parties agreed to move the trial from January 2009 to
November 2008, to accommodate for the maternity leave of Megan Ashton
(“Ashton”), a DNA expert with the Montana Crime lab.59 Ashton’s doctor
subsequently prohibited her from traveling from Missoula to Havre for the
November trial, however.60 The State attempted, but failed to replace Ashton with another expert.61 Six days before trial, the State conducted a videotaped deposition of Ashton.62 Counsel for both parties attended, and Norquay’s counsel cross-examined Ashton.63
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 824.
Id. at 824–825.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 817, 819–820.
Id. at 822.
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The court denied Norquay’s motion to continue until Ashton recovered.64 At trial, over Norquay’s objection, the court granted the State’s motion to introduce the videotaped deposition.65 Both parties eventually relied
on parts of Ashton’s deposition.66 The jury found Norquay guilty on all
counts.67
On appeal, Norquay argued that the district court’s admission of the
videotaped deposition violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront Ashton.68 He asserted that the State did not make a good-faith effort to present
Ashton at trial and, therefore, failed to establish her unavailability.69
Both the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution
grant defendants the right to confront witnesses against them.70 While the
Confrontation Clause normally requires that a witness testify in court, recorded testimony is allowed at trial under limited circumstances.71 First, a
court must “determine that the defendant has had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness in some forum.”72 Second, the court must “deem the
witness unavailable for trial.”73 Since Norquay cross-examined Ashton at
her deposition, the first element was not at issue; Norquay only challenged
Ashton’s “unavailability” for trial.74
A party seeking to introduce recorded testimony “bears the burden of
demonstrating that it made a ‘good faith effort’ to secure the witness’s presence at trial.”75 To make this determination, the court employs a reasonableness standard based on the totality of the circumstances.76 Because the
unavailability of a pregnant witness for Confrontation Clause purposes was
an issue of first impression, the Montana Supreme Court turned to its closest precedent.77 In State v. Hart, the Court affirmed the admission of a
witness’s videotaped testimony when he left Montana, evaded police officers, and declined to testify at trial.78 The State deposed the reluctant
witness five days before trial, and opposing counsel cross-examined him.79
As another guide, the Court looked at City of Helena v. Roan, where it
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 820.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 819.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 819–820.
Id. at 820.
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 820.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
Id. (citing State v. Hart, 214 P.3d 1273 (Mont. 2009)).
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 821.
Id.
Hart, 214 P.3d at 1280.
Id.
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concluded that a witness’s fiancé’s pregnancy, and the requisite recovery
time, demonstrated good cause for delaying trial.80
The Court also examined the factors courts consider when determining
witness unavailability due to illness.81 A court may deem a witness unavailable if a physical illness renders the witness unable to testify.82 Courts
have considered “the nature of the illness, the expected time of recovery,
the reliability of the evidence concerning the illness, the importance of the
absent witness to the case, and other special circumstances.”83 In United
States v. McGuire, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied these factors
to address the unavailability of a pregnant witness, holding that the district
court properly relied on a physician’s statement when deeming a pregnant
witness unavailable to testify at a criminal trial.84
Applying these principles, the Norquay Court held that the lower court
properly relied upon the physician’s statement that Ashton could not travel
to testify while pregnant.85 The Court reasoned that pregnancy “poses special risks to a woman and her unborn child.”86 The Court also noted that
this was a complex trial involving approximately 50 other witnesses, and
that the district court could not accurately predict when Ashton would have
her baby or when it would be safe for her to travel.87 If the district court
had rescheduled, Norquay’s trial could have been delayed significantly.88
Further, the Court emphasized that the jury “had the opportunity to view the
demeanor of the witness and evaluate her credibility.”89 Norquay did not
contest the substance of Ashton’s testimony and even suggested that her
DNA evidence would be in his favor.90 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concluded that the State made a good faith effort to bring
Ashton to trial and that the lower court properly allowed the videotaped
deposition.91
The Court then addressed the second issue: whether the Allen instruction improperly coerced the deadlocked jury.92 Ultimately, the Court determined that the instruction was appropriate because it “did not contain lan80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

City of Helena v. Roan, 226 P.3d 601, 604 (Mont. 2010).
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 820–821.
Mont. R. Evid. 804(a)(4).
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 821.
U.S. v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002).
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 822.
Id. at 821–822.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 822.
Id. at 822–823.
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guage that instructed the minority jurors to reconsider their views” and the
jurors had “ample time to deliberate.”93
The jury deliberated for seven hours on the first day with no progress.94 The next morning, the district court read the Allen instruction,
Montana Pattern Jury Instruction Criminal No. 1–121 (“MPJIC 1–121”).95
Norquay objected, arguing that the instruction “violated his due process
rights and unlawfully coerced the jury to render a verdict.”96 The jury returned a guilty verdict shortly after receiving the instruction.97
On appeal, Norquay argued that the Allen instruction improperly instructed the jury “to consider matters irrelevant to their deliberations, specifically the ‘quality’ of their service, making a ‘definite contribution to the
administration of justice,’ and passing a ‘final test’ of rendering a verdict.”98 Both federal and Montana law protects defendants from a coerced
verdict.99 Courts cannot require jurors to reach a decision or otherwise
pressure jurors into returning a unanimous verdict.100 A coercive instruction “directs the minority jurors to reconsider their views in light of the
majority.”101
The Court first looked at the Allen instruction in State v. Randall.102
While Randall found some language in the instruction inappropriate, the
Court subsequently allowed amended Allen instructions as long as they did
not “instruct the minority jurors to surrender their opinions in light of the
majority views.”103 Montana’s current pattern Allen instruction, MPJIC
1–121, omits the rejected language from Randall.104
Here, the Court held that the instruction comported with the applicable
law in Montana.105 The Allen instruction provided at Norquay’s trial was
nearly identical to the instruction allowed in previous cases.106 The Court
reasoned that “[t]he jury had ample time to deliberate,” and that facts did
not indicate “patently coercive circumstances.”107 The Court therefore af93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
1960).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 823.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 822.
Id.
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988); State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Mont.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 822–823.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norquay, 248 P.3d at 823.
Id.
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firmed the district court’s use of the Allen instruction.108 Nonetheless, Norquay’s challenge persuaded the Court to amend MPJIC 1–121 by removing
such language as “final test” and “the ultimate responsibility of the jury is
to render a verdict.”109
Ultimately, Norquay does not present a seismic shift to Montana law.
It does, however, firmly establish that a witness’s pregnancy may be proper
grounds for determining unavailability for trial. Also, while the changes to
MPJIC 1–121 were of no use to Norquay, they clarify the Allen instruction
and bring it more clearly within the American Bar Association’s standards.110
—Paul Burdett
III.

IN RE THE ESTATE

OF

WILLIAM F. BIG SPRING, JR.111

In the Montana Supreme Court decision, In re Estate of William F. Big
Spring, Jr., the Court revised its subject-matter jurisdiction analysis for regulatory and adjudicatory actions that arise within the exterior boundaries of
an Indian reservation.112 The Court reversed the Ninth Judicial District
Court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate of William F. Big Spring, Jr.,
an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe.113 The estate was located
within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.114 In an
attempt to reconcile clouded Montana caselaw, the Court overruled its precedent and articulated a fresh interpretation of controlling law for Montana
courts to determine jurisdiction.115 The Court held that the proper jurisdictional analysis asks whether the State’s exercise of jurisdiction is preempted
by federal law and, if the State’s jurisdiction is not preempted, whether the
State’s assumption of jurisdiction would infringe on tribal self-government.116
An extensive legal battle followed the death of William F. Big Spring,
Jr. (“Big Spring”). At the time of his death, Big Spring was an enrolled
member of the Blackfeet Tribe domiciled on the Blackfeet Indian Reserva108. Id. at 817.
109. Id. at 824–825.
110. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury, Standard 15–5.4, 255 (3d
ed., ABA 1996).
111. In re Est. of Big Spring, Jr., 255 P.3d 121 (Mont. 2011).
112. Id. at 123.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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tion.117 Big Spring’s estate, located in the exterior boundaries of the reservation, included trust land and member Indian-owned fee land.118 Big
Spring was survived by his mother, Kathleen Big Spring (“Kathleen”), his
ex-wife, Georgia Eckerson (“Georgia”), and his three children—all of
whom were enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe119—Julie Big Spring
(“Julie”), William F. Big Spring II (“William”), and Angela Conway (“Angela”).120
On September 29, 2004, the district court appointed Georgia as the
personal representative of Big Spring’s estate.121 Georgia represented that
Big Spring’s only heirs were Julie and William and that he died intestate.122
Georgia satisfied creditor’s claims, sold the member Indian-owned fee land
to Doug Eckerson (“Doug”), distributed proceeds of the sale to Julie and
William, filed to terminate her appointment as personal representative, and
closed the estate on June 1, 2006.123 On December 1, 2006, Angela and
Kathleen filed a petition asserting:
(1) Georgia knew Angela was the daughter of Big Spring and intentionally
excluded her from the proceedings; (2) at the time of his death, Big Spring
had a valid will, executed September 15, 1965, which appointed Kathleen
executrix and devised the entire Estate to her; and (3) Georgia transferred the
Estate’s only identified non-Indian trust asset to her ex-husband, Doug, for
less than adequate consideration.124

The probate action remained static and unsettled, sidelined with collateral legal matters until March 2009. In the interim, Kathleen filed a voluntary motion to dismiss her claims in the probate petition.125 The district
court granted the motion on November 30, 2007, leaving only Angela’s
petition to be resolved.126 On March 10, 2009, “Doug filed a motion to
enforce a settlement agreement or, in the alternative, to lift the lis pendens
that had been placed on the property conveyed to him by the Estate.”127
Angela consented to Doug’s motion on October 6, 2009.128 Angela stated
117. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 123.
118. Id. Individual tribal members may hold land in (1) restricted allotment, a parcel of land “owned
by an Indian subject to a restriction on alienation in the United States or its officials;” (2) trust allotment,
“a parcel of land owned by the United States in trust for an Indian;” or (3) fee simple absolute, member
Indian-owned fee land free of restrictions and not held in trust. Id. at 129 (citing Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law § 16.03 (Nell Jessup Newton, ed., LexisNexis 2005)).
119. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 123–124.
120. Id. at 123.
121. Id. at 124.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 125.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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that because the personal representative of the estate, Georgia, was unable
to be found, and Julie or William could not be located, she intended to file a
motion approving the closure of the estate.129
The motion at issue in this case materialized when Julie and William
appeared before the district court for the first time since the appointment of
the personal representative for Big Spring’s estate. On October 23, 2009,
Julie and William moved the district court to dismiss the case arguing that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a probate matter surrounding an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe domiciled on the
reservation whose property, at the time of his death, was located within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.130 In its order denying the motion,
the district court applied the test articulated in State ex rel. Iron Bear v.
District Court of Fifteenth Judicial District In and For the County of
Roosevelt131 for determining whether concurrent jurisdiction exists between
Montana and an Indian tribe:
(1) whether federal treaties and applicable statutes have preempted state jurisdiction; (2) whether the exercise of state jurisdiction would interfere with reservation self-government; and (3) whether the tribal court is currently exercising jurisdiction or has exercised jurisdiction in such a manner as to preempt
state jurisdiction.132

Using the test from Iron Bear, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction to probate Big Spring’s estate.133 Julie and William appealed the
order denying their motion to dismiss to the Montana Supreme Court.134
On appeal, the Court sought to clarify its own precedent concerning
Montana’s civil adjudicatory jurisdiction involving Indian Country. The
Court began its analysis by acknowledging that federal supremacy and tribal self-government are “bedrock principles” in the field of Indian law as
recognized by federal caselaw, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.135 Drawing from the United
States Supreme Court decision in Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Engineering,136 the Montana Supreme Court adopted a
similar “comprehensive pre-emption inquiry in the context of Indian law”
that looked to the congressional plan and the nature of any state, federal,
and tribal interests at stake to determine whether the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.137
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 126.
State ex rel. Iron Bear v. Dist. Ct. of Fifteenth Jud. Dist., 512 P.2d 1292 (Mont. 1973).
In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 127 (quoting Iron Bear, 512 P.2d at 1299).
In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 126.
Id.
Id. at 127 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2).
Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engg., 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 128 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 884).
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The Court determined that federal precedent dictates that a state court
must consider three factors when presented with an issue invoking Indian
law principles under the determination of subject matter jurisdiction.138 A
state court must look to “the status of the parties [tribally enrolled member
Indian versus nonmember Indian], the status of the property where the dispute arose or took place, and whether the regulatory or adjudicatory state
action is criminal or civil in nature.”139 Applying these factors to this appeal, the Court focused its analysis on the second factor, the status of the
land of the estate at issue, the member Indian-owned fee land.140 The Court
looked to United States Supreme Court cases that have consistently held
that “Federal Government and tribes, not states, retain jurisdiction over territories defined as Indian Country.”141 The Montana Supreme Court also
noted that when land is involved, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the status of property may be jurisdictionally dispositive142 as there is a
“significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty.”143
The Montana Supreme Court then turned its analysis to controlling
federal Indian caselaw and found that its caselaw was at odds with the
three-part test from Iron Bear. The Court found the United States Supreme
Court decision Williams v. Lee144 to be controlling.145 Williams announced
that absent a governing act of Congress, the test to determine state jurisdiction on Indian reservations inquires “whether the state action infringed on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”146 Further, the Court determined that “federal policy favoring tribal
self-government operates even in areas where state control has not been
affirmatively preempted by federal statute.”147 Based on this precedent, the
Court held that the Iron Bear Court misinterpreted federal statutes and
caselaw when it asserted that “states retain ‘residual jurisdiction’ over areas
that federal law has not specifically preempted and areas where tribes are
not exercising jurisdiction.”148 The Court concluded that the Iron Bear ra138. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 128.
139. Id. (referencing generally Cohen’s Handbook at §§ 6.01–6.03).
140. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 129.
141. Id. at 128.
142. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 129 (citing Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001)).
143. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 129 (quoting White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 151 (1980)).
144. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
145. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 387–388.
146. Id. at 130 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220).
147. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 132 (quoting Iowa Mt. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14
(1987) (emphasis added)).
148. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 131 (quoting Iron Bear, 512 P.2d at 1298).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol73/iss1/4

12

Law Review: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-1\MON105.txt

2012

unknown

LEGAL SHORTS

Seq: 13

9-APR-12

14:19

211

tionale was erroneous and analytically flawed, and expressly overruled the
test along with its progeny.149
Under the revised approach, the Court reversed the district court’s assumption of subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of Big Spring’s
estate.150 Subject matter jurisdiction belonged exclusively with the Blackfeet Tribal Court “because at the time of his death Big Spring was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was
located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation.”151
Before Montana can assume jurisdiction over actions arising on a reservation and involving a tribal member, enrolled tribal members on the reservation must consent through a majority vote of adults at a special election as
mandated by Public Law 280.152 Therefore, the district court’s assumption
of subject matter jurisdiction infringed on the right of tribal self-government because “Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe have not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.”153
The Montana practitioner should take note of the revised test for determining subject matter jurisdiction in civil and criminal actions arising on a
reservation and involving a tribal member. The proper test considers three
factors: “the status of the parties, the status of the property where the dispute arose or took place, and whether the regulatory or adjudicatory action
is criminal or civil in nature.”154 The Court’s decision in Big Spring overruled its precedents that held that district courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with Indian tribal courts over disputes—including probate matters—involving enrolled tribal members. The Montana Supreme Court clearly articulated in its new interpretation, however, that tribal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction unless tribes have consented to state assumption of jurisdiction
pursuant to the procedures outlined in Public Law 280. Additionally, the
Court expressly cautioned that a court operating near Indian Country “has
149. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 133 (overruling In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1
(Mont. 1998); Morigeau v. Gorman, 225 P.3d 1260 (Mont. 2010); Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377 (2007); Gen. Constructors, Inc. v. Chewculator, Inc., 21 P.3d 604 (Mont.
2001); Balyeat Law, P.C. v. Pettit, 967 P.2d 398 (Mont. 1998); Krause v. Neuman, 943 P.2d 1328
(Mont. 1997); Lambert v. Ryozik, 886 P.2d 378 (Mont. 1994); Emerson v. Boyd, 805 P.2d 587 (Mont.
1991); Geiger v. Pierce, 758 P.2d 279 (Mont. 1988); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagleman, 705 P.2d 1117
(Mont. 1985); In re Limpy, 636 P.2d 266 (Mont. 1981); Est. of Standing Bear v. Belcourt, 631 P.2d 285
(Mont. 1981); State ex rel. Stewart v. Dist. Ct., 609 P.2d 290 (Mont. 1980); Larrivee v. Morigeau, 602
P.2d 563 (Mont. 1979); Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 517 P.2d 893 (Mont. 1974); Sec. St. Bank v. Pierre,
511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973)).
150. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 136.
151. Id.
152. In re Est of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 134 (citing In re Wellman, 852 P.2d 559, 562 (Mont. 1993);
18 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006)).
153. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 136.
154. Id. at 128.
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an ‘independent obligation’ to determine whether jurisdiction exists, even
in the absence of a challenge from a party.”155 Where assumption of jurisdiction would infringe on tribal self-government, or is preempted by federal
law, there is no subject matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed.156 This ruling is significant in the area of tribal law because it
strengthens tribal sovereignty by conferring legal matters arising from tribal
members on reservation land back into the hands of tribal courts, even in
areas that tribal law has not directly addressed.
—Jessica Finley
IV.

DICK ANDERSON CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. MONROE PROPERTY CO.157

In Dick Anderson Construction, Inc. v. Monroe Property Co., the
Montana Supreme Court established who qualifies as an agent of a contracting owner in a real estate improvement contract under Montana’s construction lien statute, Montana Code Annotated § 71–3–522.158 The
Court’s holding makes it easier for construction companies to foreclose on
liens and harder for individuals to avoid personal liability in Montana, even
when the entity contracting for improvements is not the vested owner of the
property. In the contract at issue, the Court concluded that Monroe Construction, the contracting entity, qualified as an actual agent of Monroe
Property, the owner of the real property.159 Thus, Dick Anderson Construction’s (“DAC”) construction lien was valid and foreclosable.160
In the spring of 2000, David Lipson (“Lipson”), the president of both
Monroe Construction and Monroe Property, and the proprietor of Paws Up
Ranch (“Ranch”), contracted with DAC to build improvements on the
Ranch.161 Lipson utilized Monroe Construction as the contracting entity for
purposes of the construction contract.162 Monroe Construction was a shell
entity without any ongoing assets, and Monroe Property was the actual
owner of the Ranch.163 Though Lipson testified that he intended for
Monroe Construction to contract with DAC and pay for the cost of the
improvements with money drawn from his other businesses, he admitted
that another reason for this structure was to make Monroe Property judg155. Id. at 136 (quoting Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 544 U.S. 316, 324
(2008)).
156. In re Est. of Big Spring, 255 P.3d at 136.
157. Dick Anderson Constr., Inc. v. Monroe Prop. Co., 255 P.3d 1257 (Mont. 2011).
158. Id. at 1263 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 71–3–552 (2011)).
159. Monroe Prop., 225 P.3d at 1262.
160. Id. at 1263.
161. Id. at 1258.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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ment proof and to protect the Ranch land from liens.164 In effect, Lipson
attempted to keep himself and the Ranch free from any civil suit in relation
to the construction contract. After Monroe Construction failed to pay
DAC’s June and July 2001 invoices, DAC sued Monroe Construction for
breach of contract, filed a construction lien on the Ranch, and sued Monroe
Property to foreclose the lien in September 2001.165
In March 2005, the district court ordered the parties to participate in
arbitration.166 The arbitration panel awarded DAC damages, and in May
2007, the district court ordered the foreclosure of the construction lien to
satisfy the claim.167 Monroe Construction and Monroe Property appealed.168 The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case in
December 2009, after it determined that the arbitration panel did not have
the authority to make findings regarding the foreclosure of the construction
lien because Monroe Property was not a party in the arbitration proceedings.169
On remand, Monroe Property argued it was not a contracting owner
under the construction lien statutes.170 DAC argued that the lien was enforceable because Monroe Construction was an agent of Monroe Property.171 The district court determined that Monroe Property was not a contracting owner and “that DAC failed to establish that Monroe Construction
was an agent of Monroe Property.”172 The district court concluded the lien
was unenforceable as to Monroe Construction because it had no interest in
the real property.173
DAC appealed the judgment to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing
that Monroe Construction was an agent of Monroe Property, and that the
construction lien was enforceable.174 Though Monroe Property argued it
was a separate entity from Monroe Construction, the Court disagreed, holding that Monroe Construction was the actual agent of Monroe Property for
the purposes of the contract with DAC.175 After determining that agency
existed, the Court held that the construction lien was valid and entered judgment foreclosing the lien in favor of DAC.176
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 1258–1259.
Monroe Prop., 225 P.3d at 1259.
Id.
Id. at 1259–1260.
Id. at 1260.
Id.; Dick Anderson Const., Inc. v. Monroe Const. Co., 221 P.3d 675, 686 (Mont. 2009).
Monroe Prop., 255 P.3d at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260–1261.
Id. at 1261–1262.
Monroe Prop., 255 P.3d at 1263.
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In its analysis, the Court first relied on Montana Code Annotated
§ 28–10–103(1), which defines agency as being either actual, when the
agent is “really employed” by the principal, or ostensible, when the principal “intentionally or by want of ordinary care causes a third person to believe another to be the principal’s agent when that person is not really employed by the principal.”177 The Court then relied on caselaw providing
that “the existence of agency may be implied from conduct and from all the
facts and circumstances of the case.”178 Based on its review of the record,
the Court determined that Monroe Construction was the actual agent of
Monroe Property.179
Central to the Court’s determination that agency existed was its conclusion that Lipson controlled and managed Monroe Property and the
Ranch, and Monroe Construction, and that he created Monroe Construction
to facilitate the construction of improvements at the Ranch.180 The Court
found more indicia of agency in Monroe Property’s approval of the improvements done for its benefit.181 Finally, the Court reasoned that if an
asset-free shell entity with no title to real property were allowed to engage a
contractor to construct improvements and not be subject to a potential construction lien, the remedial purposes of the construction lien statutes would
be frustrated.182 Such remedial purposes include “providing payment security for contractors who construct improvements to real property.”183 After the Court determined Monroe Construction was an agent of the contracting owner, Monroe Property, it reinstated the Final Money Judgment
and Final Judgment Foreclosing Construction Lien in favor of DAC.184
In sum, the Court found actual agency here for several reasons: Lipson
controlled both entities; he created the asset-less entity to facilitate construction; the construction contract was for the benefit of the property
owner; and the enforcement of the lien was in line with the purposes of the
construction lien statutes.185
The Court’s holding makes it easier for construction companies to
foreclose construction liens on real property when the contracting entity is
not the vested owner of the property on which the builder contracted to
construct improvements. Also, individuals and entities with title to real
177.
178.
1975)).
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1261–1262 (citing Butler Mfg. Co. v. J & L Implement Co., 540 P.2d 962, 965 (Mont.
Monroe Prop., 255 P.3d at 1262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263.
Monroe Prop., 255 P.3d at 1262.
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property and other security will be harder pressed to avoid liability when
the facts indicate that a contracting entity acted as their agent. Though
Montana practitioners should continue to ensure that the entities they contract with have the appropriate ownership over real property or other assets
to provide the necessary security, the Court’s holding here will make it
more difficult for individuals and entities using shell corporations to evade
enforcement of such contracts.
—Peter Ivins
V.

MONTANA V. WYOMING186

In Montana v. Wyoming, the United States Supreme Court held that
under Article V(A) of the Yellowstone River Compact (“Compact”) neither
the doctrine of prior appropriation nor the doctrine of recapture prohibit
upstream water-rights users from increasing the efficiency of their irrigation
systems, even if the increased use is detrimental to downstream water-rights
holders of otherwise equal seniority.187 In doing so, the Court affirmed the
findings of the Special Master and held that Montana’s complaint regarding
the increased efficiency of irrigation systems in Wyoming failed to state a
claim under Article V(A) of the Compact.188
In 1951, Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota ratified the Compact,
which allocates the flow of the Yellowstone River and its various tributaries.189 The Compact divides water into three tiers of priority: (1) beneficial water rights existing at the time the Compact was written; (2) the
“water as shall be necessary to provide supplemental water supplies” for the
existing rights; and (3) “the remainder of the unused and unappropriated
water” of each tributary that was allocated to each state in the Compact.190
Wyoming, as the upstream state, received specific percentages of the flow
in each river basin, and Montana received the remainder.191
In 2008, Montana filed a complaint alleging that Wyoming breached
the Compact.192 Montana alleged that Wyoming was appropriating more
water than it had in 1950 and that that water was being utilized for new
uses, including “irrigating new acreage, building new storage facilities, conducting new groundwater pumping, and increasing consumption on existing
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Mont. v. Wyo., 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011).
Id. at 1779.
Id.
Id. at 1770.
Id. (quoting Yellowstone River Compact, Act of Oct. 30, 1951, ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663, 666–667).
Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1770.
Id.
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acreages.”193 The Court appointed a Special Master to oversee the proceedings.194
After briefing and oral argument, the Special Master determined that
some of Montana’s allegations stated a claim but recommended dismissal
of the portion of Montana’s allegations regarding “efficiency improvements
by pre-1950 appropriators in Wyoming.”195 Montana appealed this portion
of the Special Master’s recommendation.196
Montana alleged that some of its pre-1950 appropriators had been
harmed because upstream appropriators in Wyoming had switched from
flood irrigation to sprinkler irrigation, which was significantly more efficient.197 This increase in efficiency means less water returns to the river for
downstream users in Montana.198 The Court then summarized Montana’s
two basic arguments. First, well-established principles of prior appropriation do not permit such an increase in consumption. Second, even if they
do, the terms of the Compact “amended those principles in Montana’s
favor.”199
To analyze these arguments, the Court undertook an overview of the
appropriation doctrine and concluded that water rights are “perfected and
enforced in order of seniority”200 and that the scope of the right is limited
by “beneficial use.” The Court determined that the beneficial use doctrine
restricts an appropriator to the “amount of water that is necessary to irrigate
his land by making a reasonable use of the water.”201 Once a senior water
right is perfected, “it is senior to any later appropriators’ rights and may be
fulfilled entirely before those junior appropriators get any water at all.”202
The Court used this analysis to conclude that because the Compact assigned
the same seniority level to all pre-1950 users in Montana and Wyoming,
Montana’s pre-1950 users are junior appropriators because they are located
downstream.203 Therefore, in a low-water year, upstream appropriators
may lawfully consume all of the water, leaving none for the downstream
users.204 However, the Court also noted that“[j]unior appropriators are not
completely without rights” and under the no-injury doctrine, senior users
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1771.
196. Id. at 1771.
197. Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1770.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1772.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights: And the
Arid Region Doctrine of Appropriation of Waters § 586, 1007–1008 (2d ed., Bender-Moss 1912)).
202. Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1772.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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cannot enlarge their water rights to the detriment of the junior users.205 The
Court then summarized the overall issue of the case, and asked: “Is a switch
to more efficient irrigation with less return flow within the extent of Wyoming’s pre-1950 users’ existing appropriative rights, or is it an improper
enlargement of that right to the detriment of Montana’s pre-1950 water
users?”206
The Court subsequently undertook an analysis of the no-injury rule.
First, it noted the no-injury rule is “not absolute” and is generally confined
to harm resulting from changes in the specific point of diversion and nature
of the use.207 “Accordingly,” the Court reasoned, “certain types of changes
can occur even though they may harm downstream appropriators.”208
Well-established and acceptable changes include changing the crop to a
more water-intensive variety, or even utilizing existing rights to irrigate increased acreage so long as the appropriator contemplated that increased future use when the water was originally diverted.209 The Court reasoned that
efficiency improvements to irrigation systems are the “sort of changes that
fall outside the [scope of the] no-injury rule as it exists in Montana and
Wyoming.”210 Next, the Court discussed the doctrine of recapture, which it
determined also supported allowing improvements in irrigation efficiency
within the original water right.211 Despite Montana’s argument to the contrary, the Court determined that Montana and Wyoming both apply the established doctrine that allows a user to freely recapture his water “while it
remains on his property and reuse it for the same purpose on the same
land.”212 It cited Montana and Wyoming Supreme Court cases to support
this argument, and concluded that increases in efficiency due to sprinkler
irrigation instead of flood irrigation are simply a different and more efficient method of recapture.213
Because it found that both the doctrine of no-injury and the doctrine of
recapture support appropriators’ rights to increased efficiency, the Court
concluded that if Article V(A) “simply incorporates background principles
of appropriation law, it allows Wyoming’s pre-1950 water users to improve
their irrigation efficiency, even to the detriment of Montana’s pre-1950
users.”214
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 1773.
Id.
Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1773.
Id. at 1773–1774.
Id. at 1774.
Id.
Id. at 1775.
Id. at 1775–1776.
Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1777.
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Next, the Court addressed Montana’s second argument, which alleged
that even if traditional principles of appropriation support Wyoming’s position, Article V(A) defines “beneficial use” in such a way that pre-1950
water users are guaranteed the net quantity of water they received at the
time the Compact was ratified.215 Montana contended that beneficial use,
as defined by the Compact, was the “amount of depletion.”216 Therefore,
Montana claimed that Wyoming should be required to allow the same
amount of water to flow downstream as it did at the time the Compact was
ratified.217
Article V(A) defines beneficial use as “that use by which the water
supply . . . is depleted.”218 The Court stated that this definition “is fairly
clear” and decided that “use” only means “a use which depletes the water
supply.”219 Nothing, according to the Court, suggests that “beneficial use”
means “a measure of the amount of water depleted.”220 The Court thus
dismissed Montana’s argument that “beneficial use” should be defined in
terms of net water consumption.221 In support, it noted that irrigation was
the preferred “depletive use” at the time the Compact was drafted (as opposed to power generation—a non-depletive use) and that the Preamble to
the Compact recognized “the great importance of water for irrigation in the
signatory States.”222 Therefore, according to the Court, if the Compact
meant to redefine the existing and widely understood definition of “beneficial use,” it could have easily done so in explicit terms.223 Because the
Compact did not include any terms regarding the amount of water consumed or the volume of water left in the river, the Court agreed with the
Special Master that “the definition of beneficial use in the Compact is unremarkable” and, therefore, Article V(A) “does not change the scope of the
pre-1950 appropriative rights that it protects in both states.”224
Finally, the Court stated that “if article V(A) were intended to guarantee Montana a set quantity of water, it could have done so as plainly as
other compacts that do just that.”225 By 1950, Wyoming had in fact already
entered into at least one other compact that defined water rights in terms of
depletion instead of guaranteeing other users a specific quantity of water.226
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id. at 1778.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1778.
Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1778 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1779.
Id.
Mont., 131 S. Ct. at 1779.
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The Court determined Montana’s assertion “that Article V(A) accomplishes
essentially the same sort of depletive allocation with language that has a
different and longstanding meaning” was unpersuasive.227 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that both the plain terms of the Compact and the existing
appropriation doctrine allow upstream irrigators to increase the efficiency
of their water use, even to the detriment of downstream appropriators.228
Therefore, the Court upheld the Special Master’s findings.229
This decision is only the first round in what will likely be a long process of settling Montana’s complaints against Wyoming regarding the Compact. The Court found that upstream appropriators are senior to downstream appropriators even if both users had perfected their water rights at
the same time. This determination was made without citation to existing
authority and it is unclear from the decision that either Montana or Wyoming had ever adopted this approach. The Court then made clear and definite holdings regarding the wide-ranging rights of appropriators that the
Court deemed senior merely because of their geographic location. Therefore, this decision is important precedent for future water-rights litigation in
Montana, Wyoming, and other western states.
—Jesse Kodadek
VI.

WILSON V. STATE230

In Wilson v. State, the Montana Supreme Court held that the Montana
State Prison (“MSP”) did not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights
when it denied him prescribed psychiatric medication.231 The Court upheld
the district court’s denial of post-conviction relief, finding that the defendant failed to prove MSP “consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm” or acted in a manner that “greatly exacerbate[d] [his] mental
illness.”232 Therefore, the Court held that MSP did not violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment or his
right to individual dignity under the Montana Constitution.233
On January 22, 2009, the district court sentenced Colton Wilson
(“Wilson”) to a six-year deferred sentence after he pleaded guilty to felony
assault with a weapon.234 As a condition of his deferred sentence, the court
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson v. State, 249 P.3d 28 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
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ordered Wilson to attend the boot camp program at the Treasure State Correctional Training Center and emphasized that the sentence was “very lenient given the seriousness of the crime.”235
Wilson had a history of mental health and behavioral issues.236 Dr.
William Stratford (“Dr. Stratford”) diagnosed Wilson with severe Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and rapid cycling bipolar disorder during a sentencing consultation in 2007.237 Dr. Stratford prescribed a
regimen of Abilify, Vyvanse, and Lamictal to manage Wilson’s mental
health issues.238 These medications reportedly improved Wilson’s behavior.239
In January 2009, Wilson entered the boot camp program.240 He failed
to bring his prescriptions and medications to boot camp, and consequently,
the officials did not allow him to take his medication during the entirety of
the program.241 Within two weeks of his arrival, the program terminated
Wilson for disruption, failing to adhere to program rules, and interfering
with staff.242
The district court held a revocation hearing upon the recommendation
of Wilson’s probation officer,243 followed by a second hearing focused on
why the boot camp did not allow Wilson to take his medication.244 At the
second hearing, the parties agreed to provide Wilson another opportunity to
complete boot camp in a non-MSP facility.245 The court sent Wilson to a
“pre-booter” program at the Missoula Assessment and Sanction Center
(“MASC”) to prepare him for boot camp.246 After MASC terminated Wilson for inappropriate behavior, the State reinstated its motion to revoke
Wilson’s deferred sentence.247
At a subsequent revocation hearing on September 10, 2009, Wilson
requested to be sent to a rehabilitation program because MSP policies did
not allow inmates to take Vyvanse for security reasons.248 Despite Dr.
Stratford’s testimony that Wilson could not succeed in any correctional program without Vyvanse, Abilify, and Lamictal, and in light of Wilson’s prior
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 31.
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failures in rehabilitation programs, the district court committed him to MSP
for twenty years with fifteen years suspended, concluding that MSP would
provide him with adequate mental health care.249
When Wilson entered MSP on September 23, 2009, MSP’s psychiatric
physician, Dr. David Schaefer (“Dr. Schaefer”), diagnosed him with major
depression and anxiety disorder, for which he prescribed Celexa and
Wellbutrin.250 Wilson reported to Dr. Schaefer that the medications made
him feel better, and his behavior at MSP improved.251
On December 22, 2009, Wilson filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the denial of his necessary prescription medication—
Vyvanse—violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment under both the United States Constitution and the Montana
Constitution and his right to individual dignity under the Montana Constitution.252 Wilson offered no new evidence to the district court, but he
claimed that the lack of proper medication exacerbated his mental health
issues, causing him to behave poorly, thereby increasing his sentence.253
He requested that the district court resentence him to a private residential
setting.”254 The district court heard testimony from both Dr. Schaefer and
Dr. Stratford, whose opinions varied regarding the appropriate medications
for Wilson.255 Concluding that the issues raised by Wilson were decided in
previous hearings, the district court accordingly denied his petition for postconviction relief.256 Wilson appealed the denial to the Montana Supreme
Court.257
On appeal, the Court noted that the district court was in the best position to gauge Dr. Stratford’s and Dr. Schaefer’s credibility and weigh the
evidence, and thus it refused to reverse its sentence.258 The Court then
considered Wilson’s central issue on appeal: whether the denial of Vyvanse
violated Wilson’s rights under the United States Constitution and Montana
Constitution.259
The Court first relied on federal jurisprudence as persuasive authority
on the issue of cruel and unusual punishment.260 The Court looked to the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 33.
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United States Supreme Court’s two-part test from Farmer v. Brennan,261 to
determine whether an alleged deprivation of medical treatment violated the
Eighth Amendment.262 Under the Farmer test, an inmate must demonstrate
he suffered “a serious deprivation that results in the denial of the ‘minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities’” and “that a prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health and safety.”263 Turning
to Montana jurisprudence, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the right
of individual dignity granted by the Montana Constitution “provide[s] Montana citizens greater protections from cruel and unusual punishment than
does the federal constitution.”264 The Court pointed out that Walker v. State
set forth “the standard for determining deliberate indifference as it applies
to improper psychiatric care in Montana.”265
Under the Walker standard, Wilson had to demonstrate that prison officials “consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to [his]
health or safety”266 and deprived him of his “basic necessities of human
existence.”267 In order to do so, Wilson had to show that the prison conditions inflicted or greatly exacerbated a mental illness or deprived him of his
sanity.268
The Court found that MSP did not “consciously [disregard] a serious
risk of substantial harm to Wilson’s health.”269 Supporting this conclusion,
and demonstrating the deference given to the district court’s findings, the
Court noted that Wilson received frequent psychiatric visits at MSP and that
Dr. Schaefer “intentionally chose not to [prescribe] Vyvanse . . . because he
did not believe that it was an appropriate medication.”270 Instead, Dr.
Schaefer prescribed different medications—Wellbutrin and Celexa—to
treat Wilson’s mental illness.271 Further, the Court noted that Wilson’s behavior improved at MSP on the medications Dr. Schaefer prescribed, and
that Wilson told Dr. Schaefer that the medications made him feel better.272
Recognizing that Wilson displayed mental and behavioral problems at
MSP, the Court pointed out that he also exhibited problems in rehabilitation
programs.273 Moreover, the Court surmised that time spent in a correc261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 33.
Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 33 (citing Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 883 (Mont. 2003)).
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 33.
Id. (citing Walker, 68 P.3d at 880).
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 33–34 (citing Walker, 68 P.3d at 880).
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 33–34 (citing Walker, 68 P.3d at 883).
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tional setting “often exacerbates behavioral problems in young inmates.”274
Notwithstanding Wilson’s exhibited mental and behavioral issues and the
propensity of a correctional setting to aggravate them, the Court determined
that he “failed to show that the conditions at MSP greatly . . . exacerbated
his mental illness or deprived him of his sanity.”275
In dissent, Justice Nelson opined that Wilson’s case closely resembled
Walker.276 Justice Nelson emphasized that the three medications Dr. Stratford prescribed stabilized Wilson while those Dr. Schaefer prescribed did
not.277 Justice Nelson reasoned that because MSP denied Dr. Stratford’s
prescribed medications, it violated Wilson’s rights of individual dignity and
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment.278
The Montana practitioner should take note that when an inmate seeks
postconviction relief for improper psychiatric care, the Montana Supreme
Court will apply a highly fact-dependent, case-by-case approach. A factual
record demonstrating that an inmate was provided consistent, effective psychiatric care while incarcerated will likely bar an inmate’s entitlement to
post-conviction relief on Eighth Amendment or individual dignity grounds.
—Jeffrey R. Kuchel
VII.

STATE V. MAINE279

In State v. Maine, the Montana Supreme Court modified the requirements that a defendant must meet to render a prior conviction unusable for
sentence enhancement.280 The Court declined to adopt the rigid standard
used by the United States Supreme Court, which bars defendants from challenging prior convictions unless they were denied their right to counsel.281
The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the State has an interest in
the finality of decisions and modified the existing standard to place a higher
burden on defendants to offer affirmative evidence to demonstrate the invalidity of a prior conviction.282 To render a prior conviction constitutionally
infirm—and therefore unusable for purposes of an enhanced punishment on
a pending charge—a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a previous conviction violated the Constitution.283
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
Wilson, 249 P.3d at 34 (emphasis added).
Id. at 35 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
State v. Maine, 255 P.3d 64 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 69.
Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
Maine, 255 P.3d at 69.
Id. at 74.
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On July 27, 2009, Gregory Alan Maine (“Maine”) was booked in jail
for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”).284 Law enforcement
officers arrested Maine after they discovered him sleeping in a car parked
on the wrong side of the road, with alcohol on his breath, and with bloodshot and glassy eyes.285 In addition, the results of several sobriety tests
indicated that Maine was impaired.286 After discovering that Maine had
three prior DUI convictions, the Rosebud County Attorney charged Maine
with a felony DUI for a fourth or subsequent offense.287 Maine filed a
motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor DUI, alleging that one of his
prior convictions was invalid.288
Maine claimed that the circumstances surrounding his 1997 DUI conviction made the conviction constitutionally infirm because his attorney
never raised a compulsion defense.289 According to Maine, the 1997 conviction occurred as a result of an altercation at a rodeo in Ingomar, Montana
on July 28, 1996, in which six individuals beat Maine unconscious.290 After Maine awoke, he fled in his pickup truck because he did not feel safe in
Ingomar.291 After fleeing, Maine drove towards Forsyth, Montana.292 Two
Rosebud County deputies, responding to reports of the altercation in Ingomar, noticed Maine’s truck and observed his driving.293 Maine pulled
over of his own initiative.294 Maine admitted drinking twelve beers the
previous night and two beers at the rodeo that day.295 Based on this information in conjunction with the smell of alcohol and the results of sobriety
tests, the deputies placed Maine under arrest for DUI.296 At trial, Maine
argued that he was not driving under the influence, but he never raised a
compulsion defense.297 Maine was sentenced to 60 days in jail, 53 of
which were suspended, one of which was already served; Maine did not
appeal his conviction.298
In the case at bar, the district court denied Maine’s motion to reduce
the felony charge to a misdemeanor.299 The court reasoned that there is a
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maine, 255 P.3d at 66.
Id. at 67, 69.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Maine, 255 P.3d at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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need for finality in convictions, and it would be impossible for a court to
sort out all the new claims and counterclaims about whether a compulsion
defense would have made a difference ten years earlier.300 Maine was sentenced to 13 months of incarceration followed by a three-year suspended
sentence.301 Maine appealed the district court’s decision.302
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Nelson, the Montana Supreme Court began by outlining the framework from State v. Oakland,303
which is used by courts to determine whether a prior conviction should be
included for purposes of enhanced punishment on a current charge. That
framework includes:
(1) a rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to the prior conviction, (2)
the defendant has the initial burden to produce direct evidence that the prior
conviction is invalid, and (3) once the defendant has made this showing, the
burden shifts to the State to produce direct evidence and prove by preponderance of the evidence that the prior conviction was not entered in violation of
the defendant’s rights.304

Maine argued that in its application, this framework does not provide a
bright line for when evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity.305 Maine pointed out that in both State v. Jenni306 and State v. Olson,307 the defendants’ allegations of constitutional violations were sufficient to shift the burden to the State.308
The State requested that the Court adopt the rule developed from a trio
of United States Supreme Court cases309 which limit a defendant’s ability to
challenge the use of a prior conviction to when a defendant was denied
assistance of appointed counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright.310
After analyzing the federal jurisprudence, the Court declined to adopt
the federal rule limiting attacks on prior convictions solely to Gideon violations, reasoning that in Montana, defendants are awarded greater due-process protections.311 The Court determined that administrative burdens and
policy concerns did not warrant limiting the constitutional arguments that a
defendant can use to attack a prior conviction.312
300. Maine, 255 P.3d at 67.
301. Id. at 68.
302. Id.
303. State v. Oakland, 941 P.2d 431 (Mont. 1997).
304. Maine, 255 P.3d at 68 (citing Oakland, 941 P.2d at 436 (Mont. 1997)).
305. Maine, 255 P.3d at 68.
306. State v. Jenni, 938 P.2d 1318 (Mont. 1997).
307. State v. Olson, 938 P.2d 1321 (Mont. 1997).
308. Maine, 255 P.3d at 68.
309. Id. at 69 (citing Custis v. U.S., 511 U.S. 485 (1994); Daniels v. U.S., 532 U.S. 374 (2001);
Lackawanna Co. Dist. Atty. v. Cross, 532 U.S. 394 (2001)).
310. Maine, 255 P.3d at 69 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335).
311. Id.
312. Id.
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The Court retained the general framework from Oakland, but agreed
with Maine that clarification was needed as to the type of evidence sufficient to shift the burden to the State.313 The Court held that a defendant
must provide affirmative evidence establishing that the prior conviction violated the defendant’s rights under the Montana Constitution in order to
transfer the burden to the State.314 Additionally, the Court distinguished
affirmative evidence from self-serving statements or a defendant’s attempt
to point to a silent or ambiguous record.315 The Court emphasized that the
burden falls on a defendant to prove the invalidity of a prior conviction, and
the State is not required to show the validity of the conviction; the Court
further noted that this is a heavy burden for the defendant to overcome.316
After applying the modified standard to Maine’s claims of ineffective
counsel, the Court held that Maine failed to meet the burden it had just
enunciated.317 The Court concluded that Maine’s evidence did not establish
that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because the record was silent on why his attorney did not raise a
compulsion defense.318 Additionally, the Court found that Maine’s evidence failed to establish that even if his counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, the outcome of the trial would
have been different.319
For the Montana practitioner, Maine clarifies the burden on defendants
and the State when a defendant challenges the use of a defendant’s prior
conviction for the purposes of enhanced punishment. Prosecutors and defense attorneys should take note that the Court has clarified and modified a
defendant’s burden of proof when challenging the constitutionality of prior
convictions and has rejected the federal approach, which would limit such
challenges to Gideon violations. With its decision, the Court balanced
Montanan’s enhanced due-process rights with the State’s need for finality
of convictions.
—Amy McNulty

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Maine, 255 P.3d at 74.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
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WALTERS V. FLATHEAD CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC.320

In Walters v. Flathead Concrete Products, Inc., the Montana Supreme
Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act
(“WCA”)—specifically, the constitutionality of the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision and the provision providing a $3,000 lump sum payment to
non-dependent parents of a deceased worker.321 Carol Walters (“Walters”),
the mother of a deceased employee, asserted wrongful death and survivorship claims against her son’s employer, Flathead Concrete Products, Inc.
(“FCP”).322 The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for FCP, finding that the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision barred
Walters’ claims.323
Walters’ son, Tim, died in a work-related accident while working for
FCP.324 Tim was forty-two years old and single, and he had no children.
He lived with Carol but did not provide her with sufficient support for her
to qualify as a dependent.325 FCP provided workers’ compensation coverage to its employees through the WCA.326 As a non-dependent parent of a
deceased worker, Carol was entitled to receive $3,000 under the WCA, plus
medical, hospital, and burial benefits.327
Walters conceded that she could not establish an intentional injury
claim, which would allow her to circumvent the exclusive remedy provision
of the WCA.328 Instead, she argued that the exclusive remedy provision of
the WCA and the provision entitling her to only $3,000 were unconstitutional because the quid pro quo on which the WCA was premised was not
satisfied.329 Based on the unconstitutionality of these provisions, she contended that her claims should proceed.330
Walters broadly presented the issue as: “Is $3,000 for the death of a
worker constitutional?”331 She argued that because Tim had no dependents,
and thus no person was eligible to receive wage loss benefits, the quid pro
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Walters v. Flathead Concrete Products, Inc., 249 P.3d 913 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Walters, 249 P.3d at 915.
Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–721(4) (2011)).
Walters, 249 P.3d at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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quo was not satisfied.332 Walters further asserted that the provisions of the
WCA were fundamentally unfair and violated substantive due process.333
The Court looked to the Montana Constitution, Article II, § 16, which
affords all persons full legal redress except in the case of an employee
against his fellow employees or immediate employer when the employer
provides coverage under the WCA.334 The Court also recited the exclusive
remedy rule stated in Montana Code Annotated § 39–71–411:
An employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the death of or personal injury to an employee covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act . . . .
The [WCA] binds the employee himself, and in case of death binds his personal representative and all persons having any right or claim to compensation for his injury or death . . . .”335

Thus, the Court held that the WCA, on its face, barred all of Walters’
claims.336
The Court reasoned that the quid pro quo of the WCA means that
employers providing coverage under the WCA receive the exclusive remedy provision in exchange for providing workers with a no-fault recovery.337 The Court emphasized that the WCA’s purpose is to benefit both
the employer and the employee, by immunizing the employer from lawsuits
while assuring compensation for the employee.338 Further, it described the
exclusive remedy provision as “perhaps the most firmly entrenched doctrine
in workers’ compensation law.”339
Walters’ challenge to the quid pro quo relied primarily on the Court’s
holding in Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (“Stratemeyer II”).340 There, the
plaintiff-employee suffered a mental injury defined as a “mental-mental”
injury.341 Because the Stratemeyer II Court determined that such mental
injuries were not covered by the WCA, the Court concluded that the quid
pro quo did not exist, and therefore the plaintiff was allowed to pursue a
remedy via an action against his employer.342 The Court in Stratemeyer II
held that “[a]bsent the quid pro quo, the exclusive remedy cannot stand, and
the employer is thus exposed to potential tort liability.”343
332. Id.
333. Id. at 915–916.
334. Walters, 249 P.3d at 916.
335. Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–411).
336. Walters, 249 P.3d at 916.
337. Id.
338. Id. (quoting St. Farm Fire & Cas. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 219 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Mont. 2009)).
339. Walters, 249 P.3d at 916 (quoting Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co. (Stratemeyer II), 915 P.2d 175,
179 (Mont. 1996)).
340. Walters, 249 P.3d at 917.
341. Stratemeyer II, 915 P.2d at 180.
342. Id.
343. Id.
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The Court distinguished Walters’ claim from Stratemeyer II, concluding that, unlike Stratemeyer’s “mental-mental” injury, Tim’s death was an
injury covered by the WCA.344 The Court highlighted Maney v. Louisiana
Pacific Corporation’s345 determination that “[the WCA’s] language is clear
and unequivocal. An employer has no liability for an employee’s workrelated injury or death which is compensable under the Act.”346 Accordingly, the Court held that because Tim’s injury was compensable under the
WCA, “the basis for the Court’s conclusion in Stratemeyer II that the quid
pro quo had failed . . . is not present in this case.”347
Next, the Court addressed Walters’ substantive due process challenge.
The Court noted “the essence of substantive due process” is to protect individuals from the exercise of “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” State
power.348 Thus, the Court declared that substantive due process requires
statutes to be reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.349
The district court had rejected Walters’ substantive due process challenge altogether, finding that she had failed to assert a constitutionally protected property interest.350 The Court rejected this position:
We find it incongruent for the FCP to argue on the one hand that there was an
exchange of interests sufficient to satisfy the quid pro quo bargain supporting
the exclusive remedy, but to argue on the other hand that Walters lacks an
interest sufficient to test whether the quid pro quo bargain satisfied substantive due process.351

Accordingly, the Court held that Walters demonstrated an interest sufficient
to bring her substantive due process challenge.352
Walters argued that the Montana Constitution mandates fairness and
the $3,000 afforded to her under the WCA was unfair and unreasonable.353
She focused on the denial of wage loss benefits to support her argument that
the quid pro quo was not satisfied.354 The Court expanded the inquiry and
examined all benefits available to a worker who suffers a fatal, work-related
injury, including medical and hospital expenses related to the injury and
death, burial expenses, wage loss benefits available to various categories of
344. Walters, 249 P.3d at 917.
345. Maney v. La. Pac. Corp., 15 P.3d 962 (Mont. 2000).
346. Walters, 249 P.3d at 917 (quoting Maney, 15 P.3d at 967).
347. Walters, 249 P.3d at 917.
348. Id. at 918 (quoting Town & Country Foods, Inc. v. City of Bozeman, 203 P.3d 1283, 1286
(Mont. 2009)).
349. Walters, 249 P.3d at 918.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 919.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 918.
354. Id. at 919.
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dependents, and if no dependents exist, a lump sum payment of $3,000 to
the decedent’s surviving parent or parents.355
The Court then examined whether the statutes were logically related to
the WCA’s purpose, which is “‘to provide, without regard to fault, wageloss and medical benefits to a worker suffering from a work-related injury
or disease. . . . at a reasonable cost to the employer.’”356 The Court held
that the Legislature’s efforts to prioritize the allocation of resources from
the workers’ compensation fund served a legitimate government objective.357 The Court concluded that “the challenged statutes evidence a legislative intention to manage resources by paying wage-loss benefits only to
those people who are dependent upon the deceased worker’s wages.”358
The Court recognized that the amount awarded was “minimal”;359 however,
it said that such an arrangement met the legitimate goal of preserving resources from the workers’ compensation fund for those people who need
them most—the dependents of injured workers.360
The Court emphasized that Walters’ burden in this case was high—to
prove the WCA’s unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.361 The
Court conceded that the WCA may not be perfect, but concluded that Walters had not met her high burden.362
Ultimately, the Court held that the WCA is “rationally related to the
recognized legitimate government objectives of the Act” in that, “[o]ut of
available resources, the Legislature logically directed wage loss benefits to
those persons who depended upon them, and paid a small amount to those
who did not.”363 The Court concluded that the WCA is not arbitrary or
unreasonable and that it satisfies both substantive due process and the quid
pro quo.364
Justice Cotter specially concurred, asserting that the quid pro quo only
extends to the workers and their beneficiaries, not to persons who are not
beneficiaries of the deceased worker.365 Justice Cotter warned that while
355. Walters, 249 P.3d at 919–920.
356. Id. at 920 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 39–71–105(1)).
357. Walters, 249 P.3d at 920.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. (citing Taylor v. Southeast-Harrison W. Corp., 694 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Alaska 1985)).
361. Walters, 249 P.3d at 921 (citing Powell v. St. Compen. Ins. Fund, 15 P.3d 877, 881 (Mont.
2000)).
362. Walters, 249 P.3d at 921–922 (citing Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 222 P.3d 566,
576 (Mont. 2009)).
363. Walters, 249 P.3d at 921–922.
364. Id. at 922.
365. Id. at 922 (Cotter, J., concurring).
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further limitations on available benefits may create a scenario in which the
quid pro quo no longer exists, that was not the situation here.366
Justices Wheat and Nelson dissented.367 Justice Wheat argued that the
quid pro quo was violated for two reasons: (1) the unavailability of wage
loss benefits for non-dependent parents; and (2) the unreasonableness of the
$3,000 payment.368 Justice Wheat pointed out that, outside the context of
the WCA, an estate is entitled to seek future wage loss damages in a survivorship action, regardless of whether any members of the estate are dependents.369 Accordingly, Justice Wheat maintained that in order to satisfy the
quid pro quo, a worker should be entitled to wage loss benefits even if no
dependents exist.370 Justice Nelson agreed with Justice Wheat’s dissent.371
But he further argued that while this case may not be the case in which the
WCA may be deemed unconstitutional, “given the direction of workers’
compensation reform, there will likely come a case which presents this
Court with the issue of whether the whole Workers’ Compensation Act, or
significant parts of it, has been rendered unconstitutional . . . because . . .
the quid pro quo no longer exists.”372
In sum, Walters is an important case because it affirms the constitutionality of the WCA and the Legislature’s power to allocate and prioritize
distributions from the Workers’ Compensation Fund. Further, Walters establishes that non-dependent family members of a deceased worker have a
constitutionally protected property interest in the benefits due to the worker
under the WCA. Finally, Walters sounds a warning to the Legislature that
the Court is divided and that further limitations on compensating workers
may render the WCA, or portions of it, unconstitutional.
—Mac Morris
IX.

STATE V. STIFFARM 373

In State v. Stiffarm, the Montana Supreme Court held that a district
court cannot revoke a suspended sentence prior to the commencement of
that sentence.374 The Court relied upon a strict interpretation of Montana
Code Annotated § 46–18–203(2), which required that a petition for revocation of a suspended sentence “be filed with the sentencing court during the
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id.
Id. at 922–923 (Wheat & Nelson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 922 (Wheat, J., dissenting).
Walters, 249 P.3d at 922 (Wheat, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 923 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
State v. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d 300 (Mont. 2011).
Id. at 303.
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period of suspension or deferral.”375 In doing so, the Court overruled a line
of cases that allowed a district court to file a revocation petition before the
period of suspension.376 In addition to redefining the permissible period for
a district court to revoke a suspended sentence,377 Stiffarm demonstrates
that stare decisis will not sustain a statutory interpretation that contradicts
the plain language of a statute.378
Gerald Stiffarm (“Stiffarm”) pleaded guilty to a Partner or Family
Member Assault (“PFMA”) charge and received a suspended sentence on
December 9, 2005.379 On February 24, 2006, Stiffarm pleaded guilty to a
Failure to Register as a Violent Offender (“Failure to Register”) charge, and
the State moved to revoke his previous suspended sentence for the PFMA
conviction.380 As a result, the district court sentenced Stiffarm to a fiveyear suspended sentence for his Failure to Register conviction to run consecutive to the four-year sentence for the PFMA conviction.381 Stiffarm
was granted parole for his PFMA sentence on June 9, 2009, but that sentence continued to run until November 14, 2009.382 On November 10,
2009, the State petitioned to revoke Stiffarm’s suspended sentence for the
Failure to Register conviction because he violated the terms of the sentence.383 At that time, there were four days remaining on Stiffarm’s PFMA
sentence; therefore, it was four days prior to the commencement of the suspended sentence for the Failure to Register conviction.384 Stiffarm moved
to dismiss the revocation petition, arguing that Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–18–203(2) did not permit the district court to revoke a suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the sentence.385 The district court rejected Stiffarm’s argument and revoked his suspended sentence; Stiffarm
appealed.386
The Montana Supreme Court based its decision on the plain language
of § 46–18–203(2), ruling that it clearly and unambiguously precluded the
State from revoking a suspended sentence prior to the commencement of
375. Id. at 301; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–203(2) (2009). The statute has since been amended to
state: “The petition for a revocation must be filed with the sentencing court either before the period of
suspension or deferral has begun or during the period of suspension or deferral but not after the period
has expired.” Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–203(2) (2011).
376. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 303.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 301.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 301.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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that sentence.387 The statute read: “The petition for a revocation must be
filed with the sentencing court during the period of suspension or deferral.
Expiration of the period of suspension or deferral after the petition is filed
does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to rule on the petition.”388 The
key term is the word “during,” which the Court defined using two different
dictionaries, both of which use the language “in the course of.”389
According to the Court, such clear language leaves no room for a contrary interpretation.390 The Court stated that its role is to “ascertain and
carry out the Legislature’s intent by looking at the plain meaning of the
words in the statute.”391 When the language of a statute is clear, the Court
“need not—and cannot—inquire further into the legislative history.”392 Instead, it is the Legislature’s duty to ensure that the language of the law
reflects legislative intent.393 Nevertheless, the Court was concerned that the
statute’s plain meaning was not the Legislature’s intent and twice urged the
Legislature to consider amending the statute.394
In 1983, the Montana Legislature added the time limitation for filing a
petition for a revocation by creating subsection (2) to § 46–18–203.395 The
previous version of that statute required that the hearing for revocation,
rather than the filing of the petition, take place during the period of suspension.396 The Court decided State v. Sullivan397 under this earlier statute and
held that, “the language of section 46–18–203, MCA, does not prohibit
revocation of probation before the defendant actually begins serving the
suspended sentence.”398 The Court reasoned that if a defendant proves
himself unworthy of leniency before it is granted, there is good reason not
to grant it.399 In Matter of Ratzlaff,400 the Court also allowed a district
court to revoke a suspended sentence before the suspended portion of that
sentence commenced.401 Following the adoption of subsection (2), the
Court decided Christofferson v. State,402 relying on Sullivan to hold that “a
suspension of sentence may be revoked for acts of a probationer after sen387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at 302.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–203(2) (2009).
Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302–303.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302, 303–304.
Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 302.
State v. Morrison, 176 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Sullivan, 642 P.2d 1008 (Mont. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 1011.
In re Ratzlaff, 564 P.2d 1312 (Mont. 1977).
Id. at 1313–1316.
Christofferson v. State, 901 P.2d 588 (Mont. 1995).
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tence is imposed but before the probationer actually begins serving the suspended sentence.”403 Christofferson was the first in a line of cases that
relied on Sullivan and Ratzlaff despite the 1983 change in statutory language.404
In Stiffarm, the Court held that its “uncritical continuing reliance” on
Sullivan and Ratzlaff was misplaced because the amended statute significantly differed from the prior version.405 The Court determined that regardless of its reasoning in Sullivan, the amendment to § 46–18–203(2) required
it to take a fresh look at the issue in subsequent cases.406 According to the
Stiffarm Court, Christofferson was wrongly decided due to reliance on an
inapplicable precedent.407 Rather than perpetuate an erroneous interpretation of the law, the Court overruled Christofferson and its progeny.408 Because the State did not meet the statutory requirements for its petition for
revocation, the Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded
with an instruction to vacate the order revoking Stiffarm’s suspended sentence.409
Justices Baker and Rice dissented.410 They acknowledged that the majority interpretation of the plain language of § 46–18–203(2) “cannot be
faulted,” but argued that the Court’s previous decisions on the issue had
become the correct legal interpretation, regardless of their original merit.411
Under this view, the principle of stare decisis should prevail in order to
maintain consistency and predictability.412 The dissenters also noted that
the legislature had many opportunities after Christofferson to amend the
law if it did not agree with the Court’s interpretation.413
The majority agreed that stare decisis is an important principle but
reserved the right to reconsider past cases rather than follow “a manifestly
wrong decision.”414 Stiffarm stands for the proposition that stare decisis
will not save a statutory interpretation that unmistakably conflicts with the
plain language of the law.
Following Stiffarm, the Montana Legislature amended § 46–18–203(2)
to allow a petition for revocation to be filed prior to the commencement of
403. Id. at 589.
404. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 303.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 300.
411. Id. at 304 (Baker, J., dissenting).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Stiffarm, 250 P.3d at 303 (majority) (quoting Allstate v. Wagner–Ellsworth, 188 P.3d 1042,
1051 (Mont. 2008)).
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the sentence.415 Nevertheless, Stiffarm demonstrates a willingness to overturn longstanding precedent if it conflicts with the plain language of existing statutes. This principle of statutory interpretation is applicable to diverse fields of law. The Montana practitioner must closely examine statutory language independently of existing caselaw, particularly if the
language has been modified since the original precedent. Finally, Stiffarm
should reinforce upon legislators their duty to carefully draft statutes without relying on the courts to reconcile the letter of law with the spirit of
legislative intent.
—Samuel Preta
X.

KELLER V. LIBERTY NORTHWEST, INC.416

The risk of misdiagnosis presents a special difficulty to the settlement
of Workers’ Compensation claims. Claimants commonly request rescission
of settlement contracts based upon mutual mistake regarding their injuries.417 In Keller v. Liberty Northwest, Inc., the Montana Supreme Court
clarified the burden of proof required to assert mutual mistake in such
cases. The Court established that a settlement may be rescinded due to
mutual mistake, even if the parties knew about the theory of injury, as long
as that theory existed when the parties settled and was “disregarded, forgotten, or not considered.”418
This case arose from the misdiagnosis of the cause of Kimberly Keller’s (“Keller”) back pain after a work-related injury. Keller was injured
when she moved a patient while filling in as an in-home care provider in
early 2005.419 During her initial medical examinations, two different physician assistants noticed a protrusion, or “winging,” of her right scapula.420
Yet none of the first seven doctors who examined Keller observed the
winging or diagnosed long thoracic nerve damage.421 In January 2007,
Keller settled her indemnity benefits for $27,582.64.422 Then, later that
year after the seventh doctor noted that several of the medical personnel
who treated Keller had suggested breast-reduction surgery might ease her
pain, Keller settled her medical benefits for $7,500.423 Her medical benefits
415. Mont. Code Ann. § 42–18–203(2).
416. Keller v. Liberty N.W., Inc., 246 P.3d 434 (Mont. 2010).
417. Id. at 439.
418. Id. at 440.
419. Id. at 436.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 436–437. One doctor noted his physician’s assistant had observed winging, although it
was absent during his examination.
422. Keller, 246 P.3d at 437.
423. Id.
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settlement included provisions regarding the parties’ dispute over the necessity of Keller’s breast reduction.424 After the Department of Labor and Industry approved the surgery in September 2007, Keller underwent the operation, but it did not relieve her pain.425 Finally, roughly three and a half
years after her injury and a year after the settlement of her medical benefits,
an eighth doctor, Dr. Dean Ross, treated Keller.426 Ross performed an electrodiagnostic test on Keller that revealed “chronic right long thoracic neuropathy” as the cause of her “very prominent” scapular winging.427
Keller petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Court to rescind both
settlements and reinstate her medical benefits.428 She argued that the settlement contracts were formed under a mutual mistake because they were premised on a misdiagnosis of the cause of her back pain.429 Ross and another
doctor—who had previously treated Keller—both testified that the newly
diagnosed long thoracic nerve damage was likely the cause of the winging
observed in her early examinations.430 Keller testified that she had not
known her condition included right scapular winging or long thoracic nerve
injury when she settled her claim.431 However, the Workers’ Compensation
Court denied her attempt to rescind the settlements, stating that Keller
needed to show that both she and Liberty Northwest, Inc. (“Liberty Northwest”) were unaware of her actual injuries at the time of the settlement.432
Keller appealed to the Montana Supreme Court,433 arguing the Workers’
Compensation Court incorrectly required that neither party have any knowledge of the mistaken facts to establish mutual mistake.434
The Montana Supreme Court agreed, stating that both the statute governing mistakes of fact and the Court’s prior decisions “confirm that mutual
mistake may still exist when parties know about a theory of injury, if that
theory is disregarded, forgotten, or not considered even though raised as a
possibility.”435 Montana Code Annotated § 28–2–409 provides that a mistake of fact may occur due to “unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness” of
the person making the mistake, unless that person caused the mistake by
neglecting a legal duty.436 The statutory language presupposes that the
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 436–437.
Id. at 437.
Keller, 246 P.3d at 438.
Id.
Id. at 437–438.
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id.
Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 28–2–409 (2011).
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party making the mistake might have knowledge of a mistaken fact before
forgetting it.437 Further, in Weldele v. Medley Development, the Court recognized that a suspected diagnosis that had been dismissed could be
grounds for mutual mistake.438 In Weldele, the Court found that the settlement should be rescinded due to a mutual mistake of fact after the parties
dismissed the correct diagnosis, even though they knew that diagnosis was
a possibility when they settled.439 The Keller Court concluded that both the
applicable statute and caselaw allowed for rescission of a settlement for
mutual mistake when a known fact was dismissed.440
The Court also dismissed Liberty Northwest’s argument that the holding of Kruzich v. Old Republic Insurance Company441 was inconsistent
with other Workers’ Compensation misdiagnosis cases and precluded a
finding of mutual mistake.442 The Kruzich Court rejected a claim of mutual
mistake when a new condition developed years later because the mistaken
fact did not exist at the time of the settlement.443 The Keller Court distinguished Kruzich, noting that Keller’s doctors testified the scapular winging
and long thoracic nerve damage existed at the time of settlement, but was
incorrectly diagnosed.444
Finally, the Court clarified that it was not overturning the Workers’
Compensation Court’s factual findings but rather correcting an incorrect legal standard.445 Liberty Northwest argued the standard of review established in Gamble v. Sears446 required the Court to uphold the Workers’
Compensation Court’s decision.447 That standard limited the Court’s review to examining whether the evidence supported the factual findings and
prohibited it from considering whether the evidence might support findings
not made by the lower court.448 Liberty Northwest argued that Keller was
merely trying to rebut the Workers’ Compensation Court’s factual findings.449 But the Court called that argument “plainly inapposite,” noting
Keller disputed the legal standard applied by the Workers’ Compensation
Court, not its factual findings.450 The Court also recognized that its stan437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Weldele v. Medley Dev., 738 P.2d 1281, 1281–1283 (Mont. 1987); Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Weldele, 738 P.2d at 1281–1283; Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Kruzich v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 188 P.3d 983 (Mont. 2008).
Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Kruzich, 188 P.3d at 991.
Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Id.
Gamble v. Sears, 160 P.3d 537 (Mont. 2007).
Keller, 246 P.3d at 440.
Gamble, 160 P.3d at 542; Keller, 446 P.3d at 440.
Keller, 446 P.3d at 440.
Id.
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dard of review prohibited it from deciding whether Keller’s assertions constituted a mutual mistake and instead remanded the case to the Workers’
Compensation Court to determine that question.451
In Keller, the Montana Supreme Court clarified the relationship between two lines of cases involving misdiagnosis in Workers’ Compensation
settlements. The Court noted that a settlement may be rescinded for mutual
mistake if the parties disregard, forget, or fail to consider a known fact,
provided that fact existed at the time of the agreement and was not merely a
failure to predict a future development. Montana practitioners should be
aware of this case as a recent reaffirmation of long-standing contract law
and a clear explanation of the doctrine of mutual mistake.
—Gale Price
XI.

GORDON V. KUZARA452

In Gordon v. Kuzara, the Montana Supreme Court held that an operating agreement’s (“OA”) arbitration clause does not apply to judicial dissolution of a limited liability company (“LLC”) when the OA contains no
provision addressing judicial dissolution.453 Policy arguments favoring arbitration were not persuasive to the Court because the OA did not implicate
interstate commerce or the Federal Arbitration Act.454 As a matter of first
impression in Montana, the Court determined that because the parties never
agreed to arbitrate in the event of a judicial dissolution, the general rule that
arbitration agreements between two parties are valid and enforceable did
not apply.455
Joseph Kim Kuzara was a managing member of Half Breed, LLC.456
Half Breed’s OA contained an arbitration clause that compelled arbitration
when any member of Half Breed wished to challenge the agreement, any
activity conducted pursuant to the agreement, or any interpretation of the
terms of the agreement.457 The Gordons filed an Application for Dissolution of Half Breed with the district court, pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 35–8–902.458 That statute sets forth several instances in which a
district court may order dissolution of an LLC, including when: the economic purpose of the LLC is unreasonably frustrated; it is not reasonably
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

Id. at 441.
Gordon v. Kuzara, 245 P.3d 37 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39, 41.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Gordon, 245 P.3d at 38.
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practicable to continue the LLC’s business with one of the members remaining involved; it is not reasonably practicable to continue the LLC’s
business pursuant to the articles of organization and the OA; or the LLC did
not purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest as required by law.459
In their Application for Dissolution, the Gordons cited several grounds
for dissolution that caused “irreparable damage to the company,” including
Kuzara’s diversion of fees and improper accounting and tax reporting.460 In
response, Kuzara moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration
clause in the OA.461
The district court noted that whether an application for judicial dissolution must be arbitrated was an issue of first impression in Montana.462
Given the absence of Montana precedent, the district court referenced a
Georgia Supreme Court case that concluded an arbitration clause within an
OA did not apply to a petition for judicial dissolution.463 Here, the district
court concluded that only judges, not arbitrators, were authorized to grant
judicial dissolution under the statute.464 It further determined that the arbitration clause did not apply because the requested dissolution did not challenge any activity conducted pursuant to the OA.465 Kuzara appealed the
denial of his Motion to Compel Arbitration to the Montana Supreme
Court.466
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court only considered the narrow
issue of whether the arbitration clause in the OA applied to judicial dissolution.467 The Court reviewed the district court’s order de novo.468
Because the Gordons included allegations of Kuzara’s misconduct in
their Application for Dissolution, Kuzara argued that the Gordons sought
dissolution based on an activity conducted pursuant to the OA.469 The
Court rejected this argument and determined that the Gordons merely cited
examples of misconduct to show that Half Breed was “no longer economically feasible.”470 The Court concluded that although the Application for
Dissolution referenced Kuzara’s activities, the Gordons did not seek anything other than judicial dissolution pursuant to § 38–5–902.471
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Mont. Code Ann. § 35–8–902(1)(a), (b), (e) (2011).
Gordon, 245 P.3d at 38.
Id.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39 (citing Ga. Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Newman Hosp., 658 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 2008)).
Gordon, 245 P.3d at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gordon, 245 P.3d at 40.
Id.
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The Court also rejected Kuzara’s argument that the Gordons wanted to
exclude him from Half Breed, not dissolve the LLC.472 In their Application
for Dissolution, the Gordons requested that the district court appoint someone besides Kuzara to wind up the LLC’s affairs and hold “Kuzara responsible for any fees or penalties assessed due to his harmful actions.”473 The
Court asserted that the relief requested was within the statutory boundaries
of Montana Code Annotated § 35–8–903, which gives a district court the
authority to wind up an LLC by settling and closing the business or disposing of and transferring the LLC’s property.474
The Court noted that it has “consistently held that arbitration agreements between two parties are valid and enforceable.”475 Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute was the threshold inquiry.476 Because
the OA did not have a provision addressing judicial dissolution, the Court
declined to conclude that the parties ever agreed to arbitrate in the event of
judicial dissolution pursuant to the statute.477
Citing the Georgia case referenced by the district court as persuasive
authority, the Court applied the Georgia Court’s reasoning that the state
statute on dissolution proceedings provided “an independent legal mechanism for judicial and administrative dissolution” of an LLC which did not
“change the fact that dissolution proceedings are an exclusive outgrowth of
that statute rather than the [OA].”478 The Court affirmed the lower court’s
denial of Kuzara’s Motion to Compel Arbitration for two reasons: namely,
that the Gordons sought judicial dissolution pursuant to the statute and the
OA made no reference to judicial dissolution.479
This case is significant to Montana lawyers and to anyone in Montana
who operates under an OA. The Montana Supreme Court has identified a
situation in which the general rule that arbitration clauses are valid and
enforceable does not apply. Unless there is an express reference to judicial
dissolution of an LLC, a court should exempt judicial dissolution from the
arbitration clause. While this holding is limited to a narrow issue, other
such situations may emerge as the Court examines future motions to compel
arbitration.
—Hannah Tokerud

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 40; Mont. Code Ann. § 35–8–903(2).
Gordon, 245 P.3d at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40–41 (citing Ga. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 658 S.E.2d at 738).
Gordon, 245 P.3d at 41.
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